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Abstract 
How did the European Union come to develop so many instruments of conditionality in 
its response to the Eurozone debt crisis, despite the well documented limitations of such 
measures in other contexts? This article argues that major EU actors—Council, 
Commission, and Central Bank—were influenced by their own recent and positive 
experiences with conditionality, especially in the EU’s enlargement in the early 2000s. 
However, as we also show, despite the promise of conditional instruments in these two 
earlier episodes, further EU reliance on conditional policies has not brought the positive 
outcomes the main European institutions—here the Council, Commission, and ECB—
had hoped for. As EU institutions turned to harder and harder forms of conditionality in 
the Euro crisis, they relearned many of the negative lessons of conditionality familiar 
from the broader literature and ultimately had to concede that the apparent success of its 
conditionality tools in the earlier enlargement and global financial crisis (GFC) phases 
was exceptional. The article documents the evolution of conditionality between these two 
periods, showing how the conditionality instruments used by the EU changed over time, 
beginning as a “lever” to assist the accession of candidate states in the enlargement 
period, and evolving into a “club” used to impose macroeconomic discipline in the 
aftermath of the GFC of the late 2000s. It shows why this preferred approach to the Euro 
crisis failed and was ultimately downgraded as Eurozone policy shifted in favour of 
monetary measures in which conditionality played only a marginal role. 
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Introduction 
How did the European Union, which had virtually no experience with conditionality 
twenty years ago, develop so many instruments of conditionality in its dealings with its 
member states? An obvious answer is that the Euro crisis provided a context for 
emergency conditional lending and the EU’s cooperation with the IMF brought 
knowledge of conditionality. Yet this answer is incomplete. After all, the EU’s prior 
emergency loans to its members in the 1990s did not come with conditions. And the IMF 
often worried the EU was pushing conditionality too hard during the Euro crisis.  
We suggest that major EU actors—Council, Commission, and Central Bank—all 
came to view conditionality instruments as highly promising. This conclusion, in itself, is 
also puzzling. After all, a vast literature details the problems of conditionality in both 
IMF and World Bank settings (Dreher 2009). Prominent barriers to success include 
commitment problems of recipient governments (Vreeland 2007), incomplete 
information (Spraos 1986), inconsistent signalling (Bird and Rowlands 2004), moral 
hazard issues (Ramcharan 2003), mis-diagnosed political feasibility (White and Morrisey 
1997), and political interference (Stone 2008). Our conclusion—based on dozens of 
interviews in the Commission, Council, Central Bank, and IMF—is that this long and 
chequered history of conditionality outside Europe never registered much with the key 
actors inside Europe. Much more important were these actors’ own recent and positive 
experiences with conditionality: namely, the EU’s enlargement conditionality of the early 
2000s and the macroeconomic conditionality it used before the Eurozone crisis in non-
Eurozone Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). We show below that despite the promise of 
conditional instruments in these two earlier episodes, further EU reliance on conditional 
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policies has not brought the positive outcomes the main European institutions—here the 
Council, Commission, and ECB—had hoped for.  
Conditionality is a fairly new tool for the EU, prominent only since the accession 
of ten new member states in 2004 and 2007. Since 2008, it then morphed into an 
increasingly widely-used instrument, first and for a shorter period, on Latvia, Hungary 
and Romania, which needed immediate bailout programs. But the EU has also deployed 
conditionality vis-à-vis the Southern European member states, particularly Greece, Spain, 
and Portugal (as well as Ireland). We document this evolution, summarise the changes in 
conditional instruments and show the limitations of conditionality during the Euro crisis 
such that conditionality was ultimately downgraded after about 2015 and substantially 
eclipsed by a new monetary policy regime known as quantitative easing.  
We do not pursue here a strong causal argument that each stage of conditionality 
uniquely determined the subsequent one.2 But our interviews have shown us that a range 
of EU actors did perceive earlier rounds of conditionality—the CEE enlargement and 
liquidity episodes just mentioned—that joined pressures for conditionality emanating 
from Northern European creditor states and from the IMF. As EU institutions turned to 
harder and harder forms of conditionality in the Euro crisis, they relearned many of the 
negative lessons of conditionality familiar from the broader literature and ultimately had 
to concede that the apparent success of its conditionality tools in the earlier enlargement 
and global financial crisis (GFC) phases was exceptional. 
Consistent with that broader literature, the EU has discovered that digging deeply 
 
2 Demonstrating this connection would require additional interviews in all major EU 
institutions. 
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into the most sensitive policy domains of its members proved a complex and costly 
means of achieving macroeconomic stabilization. Of course, conditionality was also 
important in mollifying angry voters in Northern European creditor states (Matthijs and 
McNamara 2015).3 Given the way that the Euro crisis was framed in Germany, Berlin 
would not have given assistance without some conditionality (Brunnermeier, James, and 
Landau 2017; Jacoby 2015). But the disappointments we document below suggest an EU 
tendency to overattribute success to conditionality in earlier periods. Indeed, while 
conditionality was useful during enlargement, it was hardly the EU’s only tool, nor did it 
always succeed (Kelley 2006a). EU enlargement always depended on much more than 
conditionality. For example, Bruszt and Langbein (2015) show that the EU used a range 
of other informal instruments to help develop CEE states for membership (see also Bruszt 
and Vuchov 2017). Yet, as noted, EU conditionality was soon deployed on troubled non-
Eurozone EU member states in that same region. And the EU approach to Southern 
Europe elevated the conditionality tool to an even more central place in its policy mix 
between the onset of the Euro crisis in 2010 and the start of the ECB’s quantitative easing 
in March 2015.  
The scholarly literature also seems to have overattributed success to conditionality 
(Jacoby 2006). For example, many sophisticated works of scholarship on the CEE 
region—eg. Vachudova 2005—have been subsequently stylised and simplified in 
citations, such that the EU role is reduced to “active leverage” or conditionality. 
Meanwhile, Vachudova’s claims about “passive leverage” and indeed a range of other 
instruments are downplayed or even forgotten. To be sure, Commission officials are 
 
3 Not that austerity ideas came exclusively from Northern states. See Helgadóttir (2016). 
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generally well aware of the shortcomings of their conditionality instruments and have 
worried about the ineffectiveness of conditionality tools against backsliding of 2004 
entrants like Hungary and Poland (Kelemen and Poland 2017; Scheppele 2015); 
meanwhile, the endemic corruption of 2007 members is also seen as resistant to 
conditionality, and some have claimed that conditionality was essentially irrelevant for 
some states in the Western Balkans (Börzel 2011).  
Yet notwithstanding scholarly ambivalence about conditionality, we see an 
explosion of conditional instruments being used on existing member states. Greer (2014) 
argues that these EU-imposed conditions have strong affinities with IMF conditions 
familiar from long experience.4 Indeed, much of the macroeconomic conditionality 
carried out by the Commission was done either with the IMF and World Bank—the non-
Eurozone rescue cases—or with the ECB and the IMF in the so-called Troika—the 
Eurozone rescues cases (Henning 2017). We agree the IMF mattered to conditionality’s 
design (Lütz and Hilgers 2019). But the enthusiasm with which conditionality was 
adopted, and the ways in which earlier experiences with enlargement also fed into the 
EU’s approach to the financial crisis and its consequences for the Eurozone, make it 
worthwhile to trace the intellectual history of the idea of conditionality across these 
distinct periods. The rest of this article shows how conditionality instruments used by the 
EU changed over time, beginning as a “lever” to assist the accession of candidate states 
in the enlargement period, and evolving into a “club” used to impose macroeconomic 
discipline in the aftermath of the GFC of the late 2000s. 
 
4 Lütz and Kranke stress Commission orthodoxy relative to the more lenient IMF (2014), 
while Woodruff (2014) stresses the extreme orthodoxy of the ECB in the initial phases of 
the Eurocrisis (before the launch of QE). See also Clift (2019). 
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Stylised differences: EU conditionality across enlargement and macroeconomic 
crisis    
Table 1 provides a stylised summary of the differences in conditionality in enlargement 
and during the two macroeconomic crises. Conditionality toward CEE states in the late 
1990s and early 2000s (top row) promoted institutional convergence on EU-15 practices. 
EU Single Market regulations have “direct effect” and often required little legislative 
work by candidate states. EU directives required legislation and often also required new 
bodies to be established or heavily reformed. If we focus on the 33 policy “chapters” in 
the Commission’s screening process, many were surely very important—free movement, 
energy, environment, public procurement. But almost none involved the basic structures 
of constitutional democracy and few centrally affected sensitive core state functions of 
citizenship, defence and foreign policy, or economic choices about fiscal, social, and 
labour market policy.5 These were neither constitutional nor economic straightjackets, as 
evidenced by the wide range of structures chosen by the CEE states (Bohle and Jacoby 
2017). At the same time, conditional measures were flanked with many non-conditional 
policies, including trade access, FDI promotion, and promoting the extension of the value 
chains of West European MNCs (Brustz and Vukov 2017). Finally, since the EU 
 
5 The EU’s Copenhagen criteria, which included democratic rule and a functional market 
economy, did involve core state functions. We treat these as a pre-requirement for 
opening negotiations. But the EU generally did not use its formal conditionality 
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controlled the central reward promised through conditionality—full membership in the 
EU—conditionality was highly credible. 
 
Table 1 About Here 
 
This was not the case for more recent crisis-era conditionality in both CEE—
where Latvia, Romania and Hungary6 all had joint EU-IMF programs—and Southern 
European states, some of whom have had Troika programs that included the EU 
Commission and the ECB alongside the IMF. These have had a quite different character. 
First, the affected states are already EU members, including both recent (CEE) and long-
time (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain) member states. Second, conditionality here is 
very much focused on core state functions in fiscal, labour market, and social policy 
domains—all areas of traditional member state prerogative. Third, the flanking measures 
have been both narrower and deeper. On the one hand, the rewards for the conditioned 
behaviour have been almost exclusively monetary, primarily in the form of liquidity 
assistance for banks or programs to purchase the bonds of states. At the same time, the 
amount of money provided by or with the help of the European institutions is far higher 
than what was available in the pre-accession programs.7 Yet despite the vast sums of 
money spent in crisis states, the EU is only in a position to reward crisis state policies 
with the promised liquidity. It cannot, of course, give them stable fiscal balances, let 
alone economic growth. Simply put, happy economic outcomes are not the EU’s to 
 
6 Hungary and Romania are not EMU members, and Latvia was not at the time of the 
IMF program. 
7 Official pre-accession assistance for the relevant 2000-2006 budgetary period amounted 
to 22 billion euro, which includes, Phare, ISPA, and SAPARD. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/questions_and_answers/11-22_en.htm#costs 
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bestow, and additional liquidity—though badly needed—cannot be linked to a concrete 
outcome in quite the same way EU membership could.  
Thus, despite some commonality in the instruments developed and deployed in 
the these periods, there are significant differences in scope conditions. The next section 
recaps the development of conditional instruments in the EU enlargement process before 
we turn to an analysis of the ways in which conditionality has been deployed after the 
2007-8 global financial crisis and post-2010 Euro crisis. 
 
The EU discovers conditionality: The 2004 and 2007 enlargements 
The rapid rise of conditional tools in the EU is surprising. Historically, the EC/EU made 
little use of conditionality (Grabbe 1999). The EC/EU mostly followed a legal logic in 
which the costs and benefits of intergovernmental and supranational modes of policy 
making were shared by all member states. In other words, the “Community Method” was 
a joint decision-making process with no quid pro quo for “compliance.” Other EU policy 
modes—regulatory, distributive, and coordinative—also had no prominent role for 
conditionality (Wallace 2015). At most, one might see proto-conditionality in the 
structural funds, which member states received only if they fulfilled complex 
requirements (Hooghe 1996). Conditionality was mainly a minor EU tool in its dealings 
with third countries (and then only rarely) (Smith 2003). When the EU made below-
market emergency loans to member states in the 1990s, it used no conditionality. Even 
EU enlargement waves through the mid-1990s required prospective members to adopt the 
EU’s (then-much smaller) acquis communautaire but not to undertake the wide range of 
special steps required of prospective CEE members (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007, 3-
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4). Preparations for European Monetary Union (EMU) in the late 1990s finally brought 
major conditional elements in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for EMU members 
(see below). 
Conditionality developed further when the Council announced a “membership 
perspective” for states in the former Eastern Bloc. This required translating the now-vast 
corpus of EU legislation into institutional targets for the states pursuing membership 
(Grabbe 1999). The promotion of legal, institutional, and behavioural reforms went far 
beyond prior enlargements, and the Commission developed several conditionality tools. 
These included conditional aid instruments (Phare), “screening,” national programs for 
the adoption of the acquis communautaire, and the Commission’s annual reports on each 
prospective member (Jacoby 2004; Bruszt and Vukov 2017). As noted earlier, these 
programs were also flanked by private FDI that incorporated the region into the 
production chains of Western European firms (Timmer et al 2014; Jacoby 2010).  
In short, EU conditionality was focused on one major goal (membership), 
generally targeted non-core state functions, and was flanked by trends that promoted the 
rise of CEE up the commercial value chain. On balance, EU actors had reasons to feel 
satisfied with their conditional tools by the mid-2000s. All CEE states subject to 
enlargement conditionality were allowed to join the EU. Had this not been the case, 
second thoughts about conditionality might have registered sooner. When the EU 
established an instrument for its geographical “Neighbourhood,” it modelled the policy 
on enlargement conditionality (Kelley 2006b; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2007). Since 
every Commission Directorate General was involved in enlargement through the 
legislative approximation and monitoring functions, experience with conditionality also 
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was spread widely across the Commission’s staff.  
 
Macroeconomic conditionality outside EMU: Another apparent success 
While the broader Commission chalked up a series of successes with ex ante enlargement 
conditionality, DG ECFIN officials also learned about more standard ex post conditional 
instruments from their interactions with the IMF with the outbreak of severe balance of 
payments problems in CEE in 2008.8  We show that EU conditionality underwent a 
radical shift in focus and technique with the onset of the global financial crisis and then 
the Euro crisis.  At one level, this is unsurprising since the IMF had long used 
macroeconomic conditionality for crisis-hit countries. The EU, however, had only used 
ex ante conditionality as part of its aid programs in the Balkans (Anastasakis and Bechev 
2003). It had never used IMF-style ex post conditionality—where policy reforms are 
agreed to follow aid disbursement—far less with its own member states.  But it had seen 
enlargement conditionality work and in ways far more successful than the broader 
conditionality literature would lead us to expect (Dreher 2009).  
Moreover, the EU’s first foray with macroeconomic conditionality also appeared 
successful. The first member states to experience the new version of EU macroeconomic 
conditionality were Hungary, Latvia and Romania—none then Eurozone members—who 
turned in 2008 to the EU and the IMF to deal with severe balance of payments problems. 
Hungary achieved a $25 billion package, with roughly two thirds coming from the IMF 
 
8 See Clift (2019); Woodruff (2014) links conditional policies also to ordoliberal 
impulses emanating mostly from Germany. Again, CEE enlargement and (later) 
macroeconomic experiences were not the only way ideas about conditionality entered the 
EU institutions.  
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and a third from the EU. Latvia took $5 billion (less than the $7 billion allocated) from 
the IMF and EU, while Romania received $20 billion in March 2009 (Henning 2017).  
The Commission thus joined the IMF in a process that seemed to restore current account 
balances without destroying state budgets while bringing some growth to CEE countries.9 
Hungary regained access to financial markets in less than year. Latvia’s program lasted 
longer but also resulted in early repayment (Aslund 2010); Romania’s exit took still 
longer but also succeeded (Ban 2017). Substantively, the essentially liberal reform path 
reinforced the “market fundamentalism” that informed views at the Commission (and 
also in Berlin) (Woodruff 2014).10  
Thus, it is understandable the Commission entered the post-2010 period 
overconfident in both its conditional tools and its substantive market liberal prescriptions. 
After all, conditionality had worked once in the ex ante fashion of enlargement—CEE 
states had to meet reform conditions before joining—and it worked again in more 
traditional ex post fashion after 2008—where CEE states in crisis received emergency 
liquidity support but then pushed through painful reforms that restored market access 
ahead of schedule.  
Yet CEE cases of macroeconomic crisis were different from those that would 
soon break out in Southern Europe. First, the CEE cases came close on the heels of the 
meltdown in US and UK financial markets and were properly diagnosed as financial and 
banking crises and not of public debt (Blyth 2017). Second, their resolution went hand in 
 
9 The ECB had little involvement because these were not Eurozone members (Latvia 
joined later). See Aslund 2010. 
10 To be sure, local officials sometimes radicalised structural reforms beyond what the 
EU and IMF required. See Ban (2016, Chapter 9).  
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hand with sustained investment spending in the region (especially by German auto 
manufacturers) (Timmer et al 2014).11 Third, the CEE crisis states’ non-membership of 
EMU meant they could devalue their currencies.12 Fourth, with the partial exception of 
Latvia, their banking bailout bills were paid mostly by outsiders (e.g., Nordic, Austrian, 
and Italian banks) (Epstein 2017).13 
 
Macroeconomic conditionality in the Eurozone: From lever to club        
Since 1998, EMU membership had been conditional on states’ success in meeting 
“convergence criteria” established by the Maastricht Treaty (Dyson and Featherstone 
1999). Two salient features resulted for future EU conditionality. First, the success of 
economically weaker member states in achieving demanding fiscal and monetary targets 
suggested to many policy-makers that conditional pressures could induce governments to 
adopt the “right” policies, overcoming domestic opposition (Ferrera and Gualmini 2010). 
Second, however, there was evidence of states “gaming” the process to meet the 
convergence criteria more painlessly. Accounting tricks of various kinds artificially 
reduced debt figures, most notably in Greece (European Commission 2010a).  
This combination of successful ex ante conditionality with mistrust towards the 
weaker Southern economies’ commitment to continued fiscal rigor reinforced calls for 
close supervision of EMU governments. However, the main instrument for achieving 
this—the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)—was not successful in conditioning member 
 
11 That said, while FDI inflows to the region remained positive, they fell sharply in 
magnitude after 2008. See Bohle and Greskovits (2019, 1075-8). 
12 Of the three, only Hungary took this route. 
13 However, Ban (2019) shows that the Romanian state also guaranteed bank balance 
sheets as part of the Vienna Agreement. 
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state fiscal stances, particularly once France and Germany had violated its strictures (de 
Grauwe 2010). But the SGP did reveal an enthusiasm for external supervision and 
disciplining, particularly present amongst Northern European EMU members nervous 
about pooling monetary sovereignty with the South.  
 The Eurozone crisis began with Greece’s slide into insolvency in 2010. Unlike 
with ex ante enlargement conditionality, however, there was no time to demand policy 
change prior to an EU response. And unlike with ex post macroeconomic conditionality 
in CEE, Southern Europe saw not only crises of liquidity but also of both legacy debt and 
large banking sector meltdowns. Conditionality would therefore move beyond the 
“leverage” characteristic of the enlargement process to become a more coercive 
instrument for disciplining member state governments: a “club” rather than a “lever.” 
The €110 billion May 2010 Greek bailout agreed by the Troika had to overcome a 
good deal of political resistance, and this explains some of its harshness. European elites 
felt a tension between avoiding broader contagion and creating moral hazard. They also 
were constrained by Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty that outlawed direct bailouts of 
indebted EMU governments or debt monetization. The Troika lent Greece the money, but 
on condition that it implement drastic austerity measures to reduce its debt and introduce 
politically contentious structural reforms. By imposing harsh conditions on Greece, it was 
thought that moral hazard would be attenuated. And the more unpleasant the conditions, 
the more it would signal that bailouts would not be an easy option for profligate 
Eurozone governments (Jacoby 2015; Geithner 2012).  
However, this punitive approach also made austerity more likely to provoke a 
deepening of the economic crisis, cancelling out whatever fiscal gains were painfully 
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achieved (Blyth 2013, Ch.2). The 2010 Troika programme imposed a brutal economic 
adjustment on the Greek population, demanding that Greece reduce its general deficit by 
11% of GDP over three years (Henning 2017, 85, 261 Annex 1). Senior IMF officials 
opposed the bailout package, predicting it would lead to a deep recession and increased 
financial problems (Wroughton et al 2015). But the Commission—following key member 
states—insisted on harsh fiscal adjustments that went well beyond what the EU had ever 
before asked of states—member or prospective member—and beyond the level of 
harshness the IMF thought workable or wise. Pay for civil servants was slashed, and 
public investment cut by €500 million; meanwhile revenue raising measures equalling 
4% of Greek GDP were required by raising sales taxes and taxes on tobacco, and alcohol 
(Henning 2011, 37). In other words, the Troika prescribed how the axe was to fall in 
order to pay Greece’s debts, drawing on the experience of the IMF’s structural 
adjustment programmes typically applied to developing countries (Greer 2014). Greece 
agreed to consult the Troika before “modifying” any measures or “adopting new 
measures that may deviate from the goals of the programme” (IMF 2011). 
 On top of this fiscal medicine, the Commission also diagnosed structural 
economic weaknesses, arguing that Greece “underperforms in many structural policy 
areas,” notably “rigid product and labour markets” that would “undermine the Greek 
economy’s capacity to adjust” (European Commission 2010b, 6). The Programme thus 
laid down an ambitious plan for the reform of the Greek state and economy, with a 
conditionality regime to make further disbursements of aid dependent on achieved agreed 
reform targets. Not only would Greeks face cuts in government spending and tax rises, 
but they would also be exposed to a variety of marketizing reforms which disrupted 
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established business practices, adding regulatory uncertainty to the strains on internal 
demand. 
Predictably, a second bailout soon was needed because of the sharper than 
forecast collapse of Greek GDP in the wake of the austerity measures introduced and the 
spiking of interest rates across the Eurozone periphery sparking fears of contagion. The 
second Greek rescue package, worth €164.5 billion, was agreed in late 2011 (European 
Commission 2012). This package brought additional conditions, including a 22% 
minimum wage cut and reductions in social expenditure of €1.6 billion (Henning, 2017, 
264) as well as the introduction into “the Greek legal framework [of] a provision ensuring 
that priority is granted to debt servicing payments” (Eurogroup 2012). Conditionality 
tools thus altered the constitution to attempt to prevent the Greek state spending on its 
citizens’ money that could repay international creditors. Greece’s third bailout, in June 
2015, contained even harsher measures than initially planned after the left-wing Greek 
government had called a referendum on the original proposal for assistance from the 
European Stability Mechanism (Schelkle 2017, 173), revealing with renewed clarity the 
disciplinary function of conditionality. 
Other Troika programmes revealed similar EU inclinations toward detailed, 
intrusive and sometimes quite harsh use of conditions. The 2011 Irish bailout, worth €85 
billion, prescribed detailed cost-cutting measures such as a public sector pay freeze and a 
€1 cut in the hourly minimum wage. The 2011 Portuguese bailout, amounting to €78 
billion, required a cut in average public sector wages by 5%, a reduction in national civil 
servant numbers by 1% in both 2012 and 2013 (Henning, 2017, 126, 263), cuts in 
pension spending by 3.4% of GDP, and tax hikes worth 1.7% (Neuger and Reis 2011). In 
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Ireland and Portugal together, around 400 distinct measures were recommended by the 
Troika (Kincaid 2016: 32). Cypriot conditionality was similar to that of Greece and 
Portugal, involving VAT raises and a freeze on public sector wages (Griffiths and 
Todoulos 2015, 15).14  
The EU’s bailout conditionality carried a clear political message. As Angela 
Merkel told the Bild am Sonntag, “These countries can see that the path taken by Greece 
with the IMF is not an easy one. As a result they will do all they can to avoid this 
themselves.”15 And according to former US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s 
memoirs, EU leaders took the view that, “we’re going to teach the Greeks a lesson. They 
are really terrible. They lied to us. They suck, and they were profligate and took 
advantage of the whole basic thing, and we’re going to crush them” (Geithner 2012). By 
attaching painful and extensive conditions to financial assistance, European policy-
makers accentuated a power hierarchy between the financially troubled member states 
and their creditors. Given the politics of creditor states, the EMU’s no bailout clause, and 
the poor performance of the EMU periphery, some form of conditionality was likely 
unavoidable. But whether the EU was wise to push conditions the IMF found harsh and 
counterproductive is questionable. At several points, the old conditionality levers were 
wielded as clubs, inflicting wounds which have destabilised the politics of the periphery 
states in lasting ways. 
 
14 Spain differed in that its bailout was later (2012), smaller (€40 billion), came not from 
the Troika (but from the EU’s then-new European Stability Mechanism) and provided 
funds to backstop Spanish banks rather than government borrowing (although the two 
were connected). 
15 “Eurozone approves massive Greece bail-out,” BBC News, 2 May 2010 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8656649.stm 
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The revenge of the technocrats: Conditionality and the ECB 
While the ECB already had a voice in conditionality through its position in the Troika, it 
also developed novel forms of conditionality of its own. The financial distress of the Euro 
crisis gave the ECB leverage to insist on specific policy measures in return for emergency 
liquidity assistance (Henning, 2017, 66-69). The ECB demanded of certain member states 
specific policy responses as a precondition for enhanced liquidity. For example, then-
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet made liquidity provision conditional on specific 
austerity pledges by Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. In Greece and Portugal, ECB funding 
was also made conditional on pledges by opposition parties to respect the arrangements 
should they come to power (Woodruff 2014: 100).  
The debt crisis therefore provided the ECB with a new instrument to shape 
member state fiscal policy, a central concern of monetary union that had eluded the SGP 
(Wyplosz 2013). Yet Trichet exploited the opportunity to go even further and developed 
implied conditionality in other areas, notably the labour market. He even sought to use 
conditionality in countries not then subject to economic adjustment programmes. Trichet 
sent detailed letters to the governments of Italy and Spain in late summer 2011 calling for 
“intensified austerity, labour market reforms and a liberalised reorganization of collective 
bargaining” (Woodruff 2014, 100). As in the Troika’s formal bailouts, these letters 
included specific recommendations. The Berlusconi government was exhorted to freeze 
public sector salaries, privatise local utilities, loosen labour market regulations, and 
abolish the provincial tier of the administration, none of which were within the ECB’s 
traditional remit (Corriere della sera 2011). While the letters did not mention enhanced 
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liquidity conditions then being considered by the ECB, press reports indicate that most 
observers understood the reforms to be a quid pro quo for further ECB bond purchases. 
Both governments ultimately made Trichet’s suggested changes, though in the Italian 
case this involved deposing Silvio Berlusconi as Prime Minister and replacing him with 
former European Commissioner Mario Monti (Klein 2017).  
 Trichet’s successor, Mario Draghi, extended ECB conditionality. The Draghi-led 
ECB promoted a new “Fiscal Compact” that would effectively constitutionalise for the 
EMU the German-Swiss innovation of a federal “debt brake.” Pushing the Fiscal 
Compact was one of Draghi’s first moves in late fall 2011, and access to the newly-
created ESM was made conditional on ratification of the Fiscal Compact (European 
Parliament 2014, 102).16 As a result, some member states (including Greece, Spain, Italy, 
and Portugal) were required to amend their constitutions to incorporate commitments to 
balanced budgets (European Parliament 2014).  
The crisis finally began to be brought under control when the ECB acted in a 
future-oriented way to embed conditionality into a provisional program, that of Outright 
Monetary Transactions. Under Draghi’s leadership, the ECB embedded conditionality 
into any future use of OMT, which allowed the ECB to engage in unlimited intervention 
in bond markets. In other words, monetary policy responses were made conditional on 
fiscal policy changes or on labour market or other structural reforms. The application of 
these arrangements evolved as the most acute phase of the Eurozone crisis was overcome, 
particularly since the beginning of quantitative easing substantially diminished member 
 
16 For reasons of space, this article does not discuss the role of ESM conditionality. For 
that dimension, see Howarth and Spendzharova (2019); Matthijs (2017); and Schelkle 
(2017). 
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state financing pressures (European Central Bank 2015). Ironically, conditionality 
requirements not only made little contribution to the resolution of the euro crisis, but 
instead it is widely accepted that a promise of unconditional monetary firepower, in the 
form of Draghi’s “whatever it takes” commitment was the key to calming the markets. 
The need to avert a run on sovereign debt and national banking systems was superseded 
to some extent by concerns over the legitimacy of supranational micromanaging and the 
rise of populist forces demanding a restoration of national sovereignty, most notably in 
Greece, Spain and Italy (Hopkin 2015). This shift brought a softening of the European 
institutions’ stance on conditionality and a less ambitious approach to structural reforms 
and debt reduction in the troubled member states.  
However the idea of the idea of macroeconomic conditionality still appeared in 
other EU programmes, such as the structural funds for the 2014-2020 budget period 
(Jouen 2015). Member states’ structural fund access would depend on each state’s 
compliance with broader requirements of economic (but not political) governance (van 
Hecke, Bursens, and Beyers 2016). A group of states known as the “Friends of Better 
Spending” (Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK) 
supported the proposal, which won Council backing. If a member state fails to comply 
with steps listed under macroeconomic coordination and subsequently falls into a too-
large budget deficit, its access to structural funds would be suspended. The proposal was 
opposed by the association of regional governments on the grounds that regional 
governments could lose access to funding as a result of (national) spending patterns they 
cannot control (van Hecke, Bursens, and Beyers 2016). The final legislation foresees that 
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structural fund projects can be “suspended” by the Commission if a state is in excessive 
deficit and also “cancelled” if such deficits persist (Jouen 2015, 5).17 
 
Conclusion: Levers and clubs revisited 
This article has analysed how the EU developed ex ante conditional instruments during 
the enlargement process of the 2000s and then developed ex post conditional instruments 
after the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. Though the EU’s initial forays into 
conditionality appeared remarkably successful, we argue that the contemporary EU has 
overextended its relatively new conditionality tools and that this choice exacerbates an 
over-reliance on both austerity and on a partly outdated catalogue of structural reforms. 
The Southern European Eurozone experience shows that conditionality has significant 
limitations in achieving the goal of growth-enhancing structural reform. Notwithstanding 
stiff doses of austerity and structural reforms, not until the ECB’s decisive move to 
quantitative easing did growth truly return to the Eurozone, and even then the Southern 
countries failed to catch up with their previous growth trajectories.  
Conditionality also works differently in cases where countries are already inside 
the EU and the Eurozone. In the absence of a specific reward for reform, elected 
politicians have less incentive and fewer resources to mobilise political support for 
reforms. The experience of the same countries’ accession to the single currency in the 
1990s is instructive—policymakers were able to win support even for unpopular 
measures by evoking the sunny uplands of a more prosperous future within the euro area. 
 
17 Democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland have generated interest in subjecting 
structural funds to rule-of-law conditionality from 2021 onwards. 
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Romano Prodi’s “Euro tax” is a good example of this. By contrast, short-term 
negotiations on the release of tranches of bailout funds or the provision of central bank 
financing lack these characteristics, in part because national policymakers understand 
bailouts are of mutual advantage to creditors and debtors. 
Another obvious difference from ex ante enlargement conditionality is that the 
macroeconomic policies upon which emergency liquidity is made conditional are unable 
to achieve the broad goal of structural reform that implicitly or explicitly informs them.  
Specific fiscal requirements aimed at reducing deficits do not preclude that inefficient, 
corrupt or clientelistic patterns of public spending and regulation can continue. 
Exhortations to reform economic institutions, such as labour market regulations, can fall 
on both the legislative process, as measures are watered down (such as for instance 
labour reform in Italy), or in implementation, as judicial institutions reverse or nullify the 
intended effects of reform. These are among the classic barriers that IMF conditionality 
had always faced in poorer countries and were prominent in the pessimistic literature on 
conditionality developed out of those experiences (Dreher 2009). The apparent success of 
CEE enlargement conditionality and CEE macroeconomic conditionality outside the 
Eurozone was thus always likely to be a poor guide to its use on heavily-indebted 
Eurozone members. 
The sober assessment of ex post conditionality in the Eurozone also invites some 
reconsideration of the apparent success of the two earlier episodes. While ex ante 
conditionality before enlargement both achieved membership and generally has not been 
followed by backsliding on policy measures (Sedelmeier 2016), there is evidence of 
backsliding on core democratic institutions and rule of law in Hungary, Poland, and, 
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more briefly, Romania. Moreover, Hungary and Romania both engaged in brutal 
deflation in the wake of their EU-IMF bailouts, which generated a backlash against the 
parties of austerity. To be sure, there is no one-to-one link between a state being the 
object of conditionality and later political extremism—after all, Latvian democracy has 
remained intact after its bailout, while Poland’s government has eroded constitutional 
norms despite never needing a bailout. But an essential weakness remains in that 
conditionality sits uneasily with member state-level democratic institutions. If what the 
Troika or the Commission want is unacceptable to democratically elected representatives, 
or even to those involved in implementing policy, then it is likely to fail. In this sense 
there is a principal-agent dynamic, with the member state governments acting as agents 
with far greater knowledge and control of national institutions than any external monitors 
can muster. 
We conclude that the EU’s new ex post conditionality was overly aggressive and 
that it was unlikely to bear the fruit the Council and Commission desired. This failure 
resulted from the flawed nature of the theories underpinning the policy programme 
deployed and the predictable political backlash to the bullying nature of some of the 
adjustment programmes imposed as conditions of financial rescues. In sum, up to now 
conditionality in the Eurozone context seems to be working much as the experience of 
structural adjustment programmes in other parts of the world would predict. As Greer 
(2014) explains, “The null hypotheses from the large literature on structural adjustment 
policies suggest that the (they) will: be badly implemented; be neutral or bad for growth; 
be bad for equity and the poor; have unpredictable policy consequences; and will allow 
incumbent elites to preserve their positions.” Preliminary evidence from Southern Europe 
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has confirmed that the same problems are arising. One caveat to this, however, is that 
established partisan and governing elites in Southern Europe are under severe pressure, 
with electoral breakthroughs by populist alternatives in Greece, Italy and Spain 
threatening an outright rejection of the policy prescriptions imposed from outside. 
This is in contrast to the more benign role—though with caveats just noted—
conditionality appeared to play during enlargement and during macroeconomic 
stabilization outside the Eurozone in CEE. By comparing the cases we can see that 
conditionality has been more likely to succeed when used as a “lever” to facilitate 
reforms by supportive national elites, particularly when relating to the politically less 
controversial non-core state functions involved in the membership perspective, and where 
the European institutions have the ability to control the rewards for compliance. In the 
Eurozone debt crisis, these conditions have been lacking. National elites were often less 
than supportive, particularly since the measures imposed were politically highly sensitive, 
and extremely painful for national populations in the short-term, with uncertain benefits 
in the long term. Although financial assistance was a reward available for compliance, it 
preceded the actual implementation of the conditional measures, whereas the long-term 
reward, a return to economic growth, was not a gift European decision-makers could 
bestow. 
These new Commission and ECB roles in exercising conditionality in core state 
functions help shed light on otherwise puzzling developments elsewhere in the 
literature.18 For example, recent research on the European Council and the Council of 
 
18 The ECB also used conditionality on the question of exactly how the Irish retired bond 
debt. 
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Ministers explicitly denies any prominent role for “hierarchy” in the “new” (e.g., post-
crisis onset) domains of economic governance and monetary policy (Puetter 2014). 
According to this view, as member states have grown wary of the Community Method, 
they have developed new instruments in economic policy, but increasingly rely on 
intergovernmental processes marked by substantial and sustained “deliberation” among 
the member states. This has entailed a major shift by the Council towards inter-state 
coordination in various fora. Integration thus increases but without legal delegation. 
Instead, cooperation prevails, though defection remains an open possibility. 
Applying this broad argument to the case of economic policy, Puetter finds that 
the member states have sought to limit the Commission’s role in these new areas and 
have also prevented ECJ oversight by use of new treaties (e.g. ESM) or 
intergovernmental agreements (e.g., Fiscal Compact) with no authority for the ECJ. 
Puetter shows that the instruments of control at the Council level are not legally binding, 
and we can accept the idea that states can break these commitments. The evidence for this 
is substantial (Hallerberg and Baerg 2016). Where we break from Puetter is our insistence 
that quite a lot of conditionality and “hierarchy” is being used (see also Börzel 2016). 
Thus, we insist on the crucial point that—whatever deliberation is going on at the 
Council level—other agents, such as the ECB and the Commission, are both willing and 
able to flank and try to enforce the agreed policies.  
Not only has this latest episode of conditionality had decidedly mixed results in 
policy evaluation terms, it has ruthlessly exposed European decision-makers and voters to 
the trade-offs involved in participation in the European project, and in particular its 
monetary aspect. European Union membership can mean non-elected technocrats arriving 
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on missions to open up member state governments’ books and demand the 
implementation of deeply unpopular policy measures, with little pretence that there is 
much scope for negotiation. Predictably, this has placed pro-European political elites in 
debtor countries under political pressure, creating opportunities for nationalistic appeals 
to make electoral hay. Even when the populist threat can be held off (for now), as in 
Spain or Portugal, member state governments can appeal to European decision-makers 
for a softer touch, for fear of something worse. The limits of conditionality are ultimately 
to be found in the electoral nexus at the member state level. 
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Table 1: Stylised differences in the three phases of EU conditionality 
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